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Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) & the Military in Complex 
Emergencies~ 






 This paper offers a perspective on the relationship between Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and the military in modern complex Peace Operations, whether or not mandated by the United 
Nations (UN). The relationship between the two has often been marked by acrimony and mutual 
exchange of accusations for the claimed lack of success for advancing a joint agenda nested within the 
Comprehensive Approach. It suggests that the need for cooperation and mutually agreeable objectives 
between both sets of actors has never been more pressing. The paper further argues that much of this 
‘Collision of Mindsets’ is predicated on fundamental ‘fault lines’ of cultural differences accentuated by a 
lack of understanding or unwillingness to see the others perspective, and that, correspondingly, each 
needs to actively embrace an agreed Modus Vivendi so both can share and cooperate on the stage of 
modern crisis management/humanitarian scenarios. 
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Introduction 
 The intense field experience of the past few years has tended to reveal the fact that effectiveness 
of contemporary peace operations will depend on the collaboration of military and civilian actors (Abiew, 
2003b: 7). 
 Most academics and scholars would agree that this assertion for the need of interdependence 
between NGOs and the military is self-evident, yet such an assertion raises the point as to why the need 
for such collaboration needs to be communicated so overtly, unless the author wanted to convey an 
implicit conjecture about the repercussions of it not occurring. Counter intuitively it is the focus of 
Abiew’s assertion that suggests the possibility of a mutual unease between both parties which adversely 
affects their ability to work collaboratively together. 
 The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the engagement of the UN with evolving 
international security and how the global community addressed it (Egnall, 2009) and consequently the 
latter part of the 20th Century and the first two decades of the 21st century have witnessed a fundamental 
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change in the way the international community and the UN in particular have grappled to deal with these 
new and ever evolving security challenges.  
 Perceptions to threats have transformed since the 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S.A and multi- 
lateral responses to security challenges have become even more complex, which in turn underscores the 
scale of the challenge facing NGOs and military forces that find themselves engaged in responding to 
complex emergencies and who wish to cooperate in order to achieve common goals (Hearns, 2013). 
 Indeed, Modern Peace Support Operations (PSOs) have witnessed an ever increasing ‘exposure’ 
of NGOs and the Military to each other when deployed in crisis situations. Indeed, the kernel of the 
Comprehensive approach on which modern PSOs/Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs) are predicated 
advocates close cooperation between these two often very culturally different organisations. Weir (2006) 
reinforces this point in noting that current and future deployments being “…entirely military in 
composition and entirely military in mandate” are consigned to the past. Keyes (2012) concurs positing 
that “it is widely agreed that the common ground of future PSOs will be the interface between military 
and humanitarian objectives (p.17). But recent deployments have often witnessed friction and a lack of 
trust between the two on various PKOs/PSOs under the auspices of the UN. At this point it is useful to 
distinguish that Chapter VI UN mandated missions allows military forces to defend themselves – this is 
the classic ‘peacekeeping’ force deployed to patrol a line of truce between opposing forces and is often 
referred to as a PSO, whereas PKOs are usually associated with a Chapter VII mission which allows a 
UN force to engage in combat to achieve the mandate and not just in self-defence (Ramsbotham et al., 
2011). 
 This paper will examine the nature of both organisations in order to determine the culture that 
forms not only their respective doctrine and modus operandi, but also their individual strengths and 
weaknesses, and the ‘fault lines’ that occur between military forces and NGOs that will in turn provide an 
outline of the shifting context in which those relations are being played out. Problems that have occurred 
in the past will be highlighted which in turn will provide a lessons learned analysis of common grounds 
that can be sought out to establish better cooperation, as will some efforts made so far to remedy these 
and create a mutually agreeable modus vivendi while acknowledging that each is uniquely culturally separate 
and embracing the philosophy of ‘vive la difference.’ Finally, challenges and prospects for the future will be 
assessed. 
As Thornberry (1997) based on his experience as a former UN Deputy General Secretary has noted: 
 
 Without pretending to the gift of prophesy, it seems to me likely that the current pattern of 
 mixed, or multi-component peace support operations will continue into the future and that these 
 will, to a lesser or greater degree, be accompanied in the field by an array of inter-governmental 
 and non-governmental organisations (1997: 34). 
 
 In effect the central question then becomes not whether these organisations can resolve their 
differences, but how to best ensure that these differences can be overcome in order to achieve the 
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mission, because as Abiew (2003) has stressed “only a well-planned and coordinated combination of 
civilian and military measures can create the conditions necessary for long term stability and peace in 
societies torn apart by war” (p. 5). 
 
Sands of Time ~ Humanitarian Intervention 
 West (2001) has noted the nuanced changes that have occurred in Humanitarian action, including 
preventive and protection action, relief action, forcible action, as well as more general (awareness-raising) 
activities (p. 14-23), where in addition to NGOs, a broad range of other humanitarian actors feature 
under each heading, of which the military is considered to be quite significant. West (2001) outlines the 
historical evolution of NGOs from the late 18th/19th centuries onwards and that this evolution is 
considered to have come full circle in the sense of ‘fourth generation’ NGOs of the late 1980s/early 
1990s. This debate was further propelled in 1992, ‘An Agenda for Peace’, by Boutros-Ghali, the then 
Secretary General of the United Nations, calling for a fundamental review in the way peacekeeping was 
performed, drawing on the attention of human security (Goodhand, 2006). Matláry (2002) outlines 
further changes in the debate of humanitarian intervention predicated on concepts of ‘human security’ 
and (military) humanitarian intervention.  This debate has come to the fore of late with arguments of 
humanitarian intervention based on the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), what Murray (2012) 
posits “seeks to put a face on global security matters, and centres more on the protection of individuals 
within states” (p. 64). The R2P doctrine as enunciated at the UN 2005 World Summit argues that the 
international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to 
protect populations from crimes against the population. If a State fails to protect its populations or is in 
fact the perpetrator of crimes, the international community must be prepared to take stronger measures, 
including the collective use of force through the UN Security Council.  One clear outcome of the new 
R2P doctrine is that it significantly alters in the broadest sense, the description of peacekeeping and peace 
support operations that has been used in the past by journalists, diplomats, academics and others. 
 It is in this area in coming years that historians may reflect on profound changes to this concept 
and how it will impinge on both NGOs and the military in future humanitarian interventions. Arguably 
R2P only reaffirms a principle that was always inherent in the UN Charter and now requires a 
reconceptualization of this principle into a modern coherent effective doctrine for the 21st Century. This 
paper does not propose that the positioning of security policy within a human rights framework is by any 
means assured, or if it has commenced, that it is likely to be completed in the near future. However, 
events in Kosovo, East Timor and Libya as well as the continuing debate about humanitarian intervention 
(or lack of) in the unfolding Syrian tragedy, nonetheless do suggest that military humanitarian intervention 
is likely to rise again. In the context of this paper, therefore, it is argued that whenever/wherever this 
occurs, military forces and NGOs will almost inevitably encounter each other despite the fears regarding 
the ‘militarization’ of humanitarianism. Consequently, logic would suggest that it is better for both sides 
(NGOs and military) to be prepared for such encounters and to avail of the potential which exists to 
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assist each other in the achievement of their common goals (Victory, 2002). At the very least, this might 
allow for more efficient division of labour. At best, it might actively hasten the conclusion of complex 
emergency scenarios, allow for more rapid transition to the post- emergency (re-building) phase and 
thereby enable a speedier activation of the respective exit strategies of NGOs and the military.  
 This qualification having been made, in the next section we will examine the nature of both 
organisations in order to determine the unique culture that informs both respective organisations and 
lends them their own unique and individual identity that also de facto sets them apart. 
 
NGOs & the Humanitarian Space Imperative 
 Before examining the nature of NGOs it is first important to establish what exactly is meant by a 
non-governmental organisation. They differ in scale and philosophy and have different roles and goals 
(MacIntyre, 2011). Human Rights NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are 
propelled by the raison d’etre of basic human rights for all mankind regardless of creed, colour or culture. 
Humanitarian NGOs such as the Red Cross/Crescent, Oxfam and Medicins Sans Frontiers respond to 
international humanitarian crises, and concentrate mostly on relief and development efforts (Aal, 2000). 
But as Weiss (2005) has noted there are hundreds of different NGOs and caution must be taken against 
any generalisation, in particular when considering their approach to operations (p. 205). But despite the 
size, variety and type of NGOs, most nonetheless abide by a number of fundamental principles that 
inherently guide their subsequent actions and attitudes, and directly inform their relationships with not 
only each other but also the military when deployed in crisis management operations. In this regard a key 
tenet for NGOs is the necessity to remain neutral and impartial; Byman (2001) contends that “in essence, 
these organisations stay safe by making themselves non-threatening: their weakness protects them” (p. 
104). Additionally, this is perceived as a key enabler for NGOs, as “in order to gain the trust of all sides of 
the conflict, a humanitarian organisation should not take sides” (Weir, 2006: 21). For NGOs 
humanitarian space is where an agency can “operate freely and meet humanitarian needs in accordance 
with the principles of humanitarian action” (Collinson & Elhawary, 2012: 1). Therefore, humanitarian 
“space was once considered the responsibility of NGOs, operating autonomously from military actions” 
(Shannon, 2009). It is in this regard that the objection arises by many NGOs, who are fundamentally 
opposed to operating with the military for ideological reasons. “They perceive the military and 
humanitarian actors existing in two fundamentally different and unconnected spheres of activity” 
(Hearns, 2013: 183). Another cause of friction is the issue of perceived impartiality whereby humanitarian 
actors are not seen to be on any side of the conflict, ergo they are viewed as less a threat to the warring 
parties or belligerent forces (Byman, 2001).  This from their perceived viewpoint allows NGOs to build 
up trust and confidence with the warring parties, which could later be vital for peace negotiations (Jenny, 
2001). 
 Because of the fact that NGOs are generally perceived as neutral, devoid of any political agenda 
and pursuing what is regarded as a noble cause, this gives them a number of comparative advantages. 
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Along with the humanitarian principles, NGOs have a unique role within the conflict theatre and are seen 
as ‘indispensable interveners’ (Woods, 1996: 684). Their flexibility, ability to adapt and change, and their 
independence makes NGOs good candidates in terms of complex conflict, which is ever changing 
(Ahmed & Potter, 2006; Sutton, 1987). In general, NGOs tend to be already working in the country or 
region where there may be underlying conflict, so when an emergency surges, they have working 
knowledge of the area (Byman, 2001; Ahmed and Potter, 2006). 
 In this sense they have an advantage over the military who generally arrive on the scene after a 
conflict or emergency has broken out (Bellamy & Williams, 2010).  But these same characteristics also 
expose a number of weaknesses. Because NGO personnel are encouraged to act as individuals or in small 
groups and to be largely self-sufficient, they can be equally difficult to coordinate and specifically because 
they do not require a mandate they can consequently lack accountability. Just as it is important to outline 
that there are many different types and size of NGOs, it is equally important to acknowledge that there 
are also wide variations in the type, size and structure of military forces. 
 
Military, Chain of Command 
 As Abiew (2003) has noted the military is not a “monolithic body. There are disparities in military 
capabilities, configuration, competence and levels of professionalism even among northern militaries, and 
between northern and southern militaries” (p. 7). However, generally speaking, military culture tends to 
be hierarchical and centralised, with clear delineation of rank and responsibility. Central to military culture 
is the implementation of the commander’s intent and the overall accomplishment of the stated mission 
and a defined chain of command and lines of communication (Jenny, 2001). Military forces thus aim to 
have clear strategies and goals and are usually intent on accomplishing the mission in the shortest possible 
time. Because of this almost inherent built-in ‘exit strategy’ of most military missions, military forces are 
often deployed for the short term which often translates that that they can rarely engage in long term 
planning. 
 As in the case of NGOs, the weaknesses of military forces, especially in complex emergencies 
requiring humanitarian relief is directly related to their strengths. They are directly subject to political 
influences and bureaucratic timeframes, making deployment slower and more cumbersome allied to the 
fact that implicitly they are almost always associated with a political agenda be it from their national 
government or a regional organisation. 
 
Fault Lines 
 Hall (1995) has noted that when differences are not addressed it can lead to obvious 
misunderstandings with inherent tensions. Byman (2001) has equally alluded to the fact that because 
military forces and NGOs come from opposite sides of the cultural divide it is inevitable that the 
differences in core beliefs lead to strain and tensions in operational scenarios and that these differences 
“present a formidable barrier to NGO-military coordination” (Byman, 2001: 104). Such cultural ‘fault 
lines’ were identified by Kennedy (1997) in relation to Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, which saw the 
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US military in the lead role acting under UN mandate during the period December 1992-May 1993. 
Kennedy in his assessment of the quality of the subsequent interactions between NGOs and the military 
noted how particular difficulties arose out of cultural/institutional differences between the sides. 
 Weiss and Collins (2000) note that relief workers’ options are ‘altered’ by the commencement of 
an international military intervention and that their efforts are often subsumed within political- military 
objectives (p. 121-122). Roberts (1996) echoes these points, remarking that delivery of humanitarian aid 
during war provokes awkward questions about the consequences of such action. The same author also 
identifies inherent problems faced by the military in humanitarian crisis situations. These include finding 
itself required to liaise with belligerents, difficulties in maintaining impartiality and insufficient human and 
material resources, all of which might contribute to fractious relations with the NGO community. 
 
Common Ground 
 While arguments regarding the differences between NGO and military agendas and the need for 
operational independence are well made, a rather purist approach can be detected. This paper would 
argue that it is precisely in those ‘few situations’ which might require regular contact and coordination 
with each other that stakes are often highest, thereby rendering it incumbent upon NGOs and military 
forces to prepare adequately for dealing with one another. As Roberts (1996) points out, the increasing 
need to secure some form of physical protection in war zones for aid workers and those they assist 
presents a major challenge to defenders of principles of impartiality and neutrality in absolute terms (p. 
53). Van Baarda (2007; cited by Byrne, 2013) defines three basic forms of cooperation between the 
military and NGOs that provides a useful framework for categorising the different relationships between 
the two actors. The first of these is ‘negative cooperation’ described as a general agreement between 
actors to ‘keep out of each other’s way.’ According to Van Baarda this usually involves a territorial 
division or a more functional division of tasks. The second form Van Baarda identifies is positive 
cooperation whereby each agency works under its own authority but coordinates its tactical and 
operational activities. Early engagement and agreement between actors is critical for success here. The last 
and rarest form of cooperation is ‘concerted action’; here all agencies work under a common policy and 
programme with one agency taking the lead role in authority. Ferks et al., (2006) categorise the different 
types of cooperation in a similar vein. ‘Principled neutralists,’ are agencies who wish to remain 
independent and avoid all collaboration. Secondly, ‘principled pragmatists,’ are agencies that abide by 
their own principles but cooperate with the military when the context requires. The last group is referred 
to as the ‘supporters,’ defined as the agencies that fully integrate and cooperate with the military. The next 






   © Journal of Mediation and Applied Conflict Analysis, 2014, Vol. 1, No. 2  
 
http://jmaca.maynoothuniversity.ie   Page | 145   
The Road Ahead 
 Challenges in the field of NGO-military relations will undoubtedly remain throughout the period 
ahead. Equally, as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in asserting their operational 
independence once again has noted, 
 
 …the fact that military operations and emergency humanitarian action sometimes gives the 
 impression that they are converging must not be allowed to disguise their fundamental different 
 nature: they must be distinguishable not only in substance but also in appearance (n.d). 
 
 This valid qualification having been made, and while ongoing challenges in the field of NGO- 
military relations will undoubtedly remain throughout the period ahead, it is possible to detect some signs 
of optimism that differences can be overcome. Byman (2001) notes evidence of greater mutual respect 
and understanding between the sides, chiefly due to repeated interaction and a decline in underlying 
ideological tensions. Growing NGO concerns about the security of their workers has been a practical 
driver of closer relations with the military (p. 107). Weiss and Collins (2000) also point to a shared culture 
of sorts as soldiers came to volunteer repeatedly for humanitarian assignments during the 1990s and 
become more familiar with relief worker’s methods. Keyes (2012) in his essay gives a vivid insight how as 
a serving military officer he was seconded to an Irish relief and development agency GOAL after the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994. For him it was a salutatory experience that gave him a unique insight into the 
perspectives of both the military and an NGO. 
 Another issue prohibiting cooperation is the different interpretations of how the military and 
NGOs should or might coordinate with each other. The coordination of civil-military relations is often 
referred to as Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), which the US refers to as Civil Affairs (CA). CIMIC is 
defined by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as: “the essential 
dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary 
to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and where 
appropriate pursue common goals” (OCHA, 2004). A related issue is that both actors are unwilling to share 
their gained intelligence due to distrust and suspicion of one another. They also use information in very 
different ways (Abiew, 2003). NGOs are unwilling to share information as this could affect their access to 
certain areas. Albid (2010) and Fox (2001) controversially argue that NGOs in certain instances have been 
willing to abstain from reporting human rights violations in order to maintain trust and access to certain 
areas. Ku and Brun, (2013; cited by Finnegan, 2013) simply state that  
“neutrality=confidentiality=trust=access” (p. 62). Similarly, the military tend not to share information due 
to their strict views on intelligence building. So although the two actors share a common purpose in 
alleviating humanitarian suffering as one of their key goals, they have different approaches and tasks to 
perform in order to bring the suffering to an end (Byman, 2001). In light of what has been written about 
the uncooperative stance in past CIMIC operations, it would be wrong to scapegoat either military or 
NGOs for their part in the dysfunction.  
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 Because of this it would be better, while acknowledging and understanding, to focus less on 
cultural differences and more on the complementary nature of their respective roles within the CIMIC 
operational zone; the aspiration therefore is, “the environment within which all actors are operating, 
situating the military contribution within a broader civil context, balancing military, political and 
economic objectives with humanitarian imperatives” (Spence, 2002: 167). 
 
Conclusion 
 The central theme explored in this paper relates to whether the military and NGOs will ever be 
able to resolve their differences and work together efficiently in complex emergencies. This as 
demonstrated will not be easy as both come from diametric opposite ends of the cultural divide. The 
military is a centralised collective organisation that puts high value on the coordination and concentration 
of effort towards the achievement of predetermined mostly short term goals. NGOs value independence, 
are concerned mainly with humanitarian issues, are mostly decentralised and operate as individuals or 
shall groups, resulting in little coordination or concentration of effort. Military forces are placed in theatre 
for political reasons by national governments and regional organisations, whereas NGOs are present 
mostly for altruistic reasons. 
 In order to bridge the cultural divide, it is necessary to introduce measures at strategic, tactical 
and operational levels; careful planning should take place prior to deployment involving all the potential 
actors in theatre of operations including the NGOs.  The Irish Defence Forces has been to the fore in 
this area in cooperation with Irish Aid of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), who has developed 
the Rapid Response Corps (RRC) initiative. This seeks to train and have on stand-by a core group of 
experts in various fields (inter alia water, health, sanitation) who can be seconded at short notice to 
designated Irish Aid Agencies in the field. As part of their pre- deployment training volunteers are trained 
by the Irish Defence Forces in Hostile Environmental Awareness Training (HEAT), which includes 
hostile mediation and negotiation at the United Nations Training School Ireland (UNTSI), one of the 
Schools that incorporate the Irish Military College. Measures should be adapted to ensure both the 
military and NGOs are familiar with each other through education and training programmes. In theatre, 
methods to improve communication and cooperation should be adapted in order to enhance cooperation 
at local level. The type and level of cooperation will differ depending on the context and therefore should 
be determined by a thorough needs assessment by all actors.  Keyes (2012) has spoken of this in terms of 
shared ownership whereby “the process of visualising a shared end state for the humanitarian-military 
relationship would bring significant but not insurmountable challenges” (p. 33). As Heaslip (2010) points 
out, this argument for integration has led to peacekeeping missions to take on the ‘three Ds’ of defence, 
development and diplomacy in order to bring together the political, peacekeeping and humanitarian 
actors. This very call for integration has brought with it a need for cooperation between NGO and the 
military (Jakobsen, 2000), which in turn has been influenced by increasingly hostile environments where 
the neutrality and impartiality of NGOs is often not respected by belligerents; NGOs have arguably 
become more security orientated while correspondingly peacekeeping has become more humanitarian 
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orientated. Perhaps most importantly it is necessary to proactively convince personnel at all levels in both 
the military and the NGOs that ultimately the beneficiaries of their actions should be the vast majority of 
the population in the area of operations. Training should be institutionalised that enshrines mediation and 
negotiation training not only for each party to interface with hostile/belligerent groups on the ground but 
equally importantly with each other. 
 The lessons of the past teach us that collaborative forward planning backed up by good 
communications and coordination between NGOs and the military are crucial in ensuring good 
outcomes. This will require commitment on both sides of the NGO-military divide, but the complex 
emergencies both now and of the future may demand nothing less, for as noted by Abiew (2003a), they 
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